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Abstract: Ontological pluralism raises interesting questions about the objectivity and universality of arguments and 
argument forms. Bruno Latour proposes that Science, Politics, Law, Fiction, and other domains are distinct “modes 
of existence,” each with its own set of “felicity” and “veridiction” conditions. If so, then are arguments and argument 
forms mode-dependent? I suggest that arguments and arguments forms can extend across multiple modes as long as 
they do not serve as infelicity conditions within those modes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In his recent work An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthology of the Moderns, Bruno 
Latour (2013) has proposed a pluralistic ontology comprised of a multiplicity of ontologically 
distinct domains or modes of existence, each of which has its own distinct veridiction and felicity 
conditions. To speak well, e.g., to be regarded as ‘objective’ within a given mode, one must 
follow the veridiction and felicity conditions peculiar to that mode, with no set of veridiction or 
felicity conditions applying universally across all modes. Thus what counts as speaking well will 
vary from mode to mode. On this pluralistic model ‘objectivity’ will be multivocal rather than 
univocal, for while each mode may have a sense of objectivity that is valid and real internal to 
that mode, objectivity will always be relative to some particular mode. It follows that there is no 
world as a ‘whole’ here, only a collective of multiple modes of existence. This raises interesting 
questions about the possibility of extending arguments and argument forms from one mode to 
another, for if objectivity is always relative to some given mode, then the same might be true for 
argument validity as well, with validity itself being multivocal rather than univocal. If so then it 
might seem to follow that arguments developed within one mode cannot cross over into another. 
I suggest that this need not be the case, for even if objectivity and validity are multivocal in the 
sense of being modally-relative it may still be possible for arguments and argument forms to 
apply across multiple modes of existence as long as they do not serve as infelicity conditions 
within the modes in question. 
I should note at the outset that this paper is largely exploratory in nature. Its primary aim 
is not to propose any demonstrative arguments or proofs of any sort, but to outline some 
interesting and potentially important implications about the nature of ‘objectivity’ and the 
possibility of transporting arguments from one mode to another within a radically pluralistic 
context. As we shall see, Latour’s ontological pluralism stands as a radical and potentially 
important challenge to a highly dominant thread that runs throughout the western philosophical 
tradition, and this paper is simply part of a larger effort to take Latour’s challenge seriously. Any 
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conclusions drawn or suggestions provided in this paper are highly tentative and provisional, and 
should be approached and considered in the exploratory sense in which they are intended, not as 
‘bricks and mortar’ but more as ‘feelers’ that are part of a larger attempt to see what might follow 
when we extend Latour’s radical pluralism to the kinds of questions and issues discussed here.    
 
2. Modes of existence 
 
Latour proposes a relational account of being or existence that he refers to as “being-as-other.” 
On this account, existence necessarily implies a relation to an other, so that it is not possible for 
something to exist without also being-in-relation. This is contrasted against what Latour 
identifies as the more traditional ontology of substance or “being-as-being” in which all being is 
grounded in something that is said exist independent of its relations to anything else (Latour, pp. 
162-163). Latour rejects the more traditional ontology of substance in favor of what we might 
loosely call an ontology of alterity or difference, with difference standing as a constitutive, non-
reducible condition of existence in the strong, ontological sense of that term.   
On Latour’s account, a mode is a way of being or manner of existing in the strong 
ontological sense associated with being-as-other. As such modes are not substances, nor are 
modes grounded in substance as they might be in the philosophy of Descartes, Spinoza, or 
Locke. Instead, as an expression of the ontological condition of being-as-other, a mode of 
existence is best viewed, not as a relation as such but as a way or manner of relating, an activity 
that involves the connecting or passing along, across, through, or between otherwise discrete 
elements that we might think of as constituting its ‘base.’  
 
As this entire inquiry attests, deprived of other beings, any existent whatsoever 
would cease at once to exist. Its very existence, its substance, is defined by the 
supreme duty to explore through what other beings it must pass to subsist, to earn 
its subsistence. This is what I have called its ARTICULATION. (Latour, 2013, p. 
454) 
 
A given mode of existence will be disclosed or expressed in the distinct character of its relations, 
with the mode itself being revealed in the unique manner in which the disparate, discrete 
elements underlying and enabling it are cobbled and hobbled together. As a manner of relating, 
the characteristics that define and distinguish one mode from another are best expressed, not as a 
noun, but as an adverbial qualification of some activity or process, e.g., the mode of being-
Legally, Politically, Morally, and so on. In this ontology of alterity or difference it would seem to 
follow, of course, that there must be more than one mode of existence for each mode must draw 
upon the beings instituted by other modes for its own subsistence, with no single mode having 
ontological primacy over any other. Hence existence here is inherently co-relational, 
necessitating a pluralistic account of being as such.   
As a manner of relating, a mode of existence will typically take the form of a network that 
is marked or distinguished by the unique manner in which the component elements that comprise 
each network are cobbled and hobbled together. Put crudely a mode exists by passing along, 
across, through, and so on, some series of elements, much like a flow of information might exist 
by passing along, across, and through a series of transmission towers, transmission lines, power 
stations, computer servers, computer terminals, satellites, technicians, users, and so on. The flow 
of information only exists as long as it is able to pass along these disparate, ‘base’ elements, but 
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such information is nevertheless still real as something distinct from the base elements upon 
which it depends. Put crudely and in a language that I suspect would make Latour cringe, the 
flow of information serves as something akin to the reason for the various elements in question 
being cobbled and hobbled together as they are, thus serving as something like the ‘final cause’ 
of the arrangement or network in question. In effect, the characteristics that distinguish a mode 
would be the answer to the question of ‘why’ the elements are arranged as they are. Modes of 
existence will typically have the character of a network in this broad sense as a pass along, 
across, through, or between otherwise disparate elements that seem to be gathered together in 
distinct, persistent, and sometimes surprising ways. In fact one of the first things we would look 
for when trying to determine if something counts as a mode of existence is whether it has the 
characteristics of a network of this sort, with different modes being identified by the different 
way or manner in which its elements have been gathered together, a condition which Latour 
(2013) refers to as the distinct trajectory and manner of alteration unique to and definitive of 
each mode (pp. 61-62). 
In general there are a number of conditions that must be satisfied for something to qualify 
as a mode of existence: 1) Under the condition of being-as-other, there must be some kind of 
hiatus between elements across which the mode must pass, 2) The discrete elements that are 
being related or gathered together must have a trajectory as parts of a series or process, 3) The 
character of the trajectory must have a mode of alteration unique to that mode, 4) It must have its 
own unique felicity and infelicity conditions, and 5) It must give rise to distinct beings that it will 
institute as part of the furniture, if you will, of the collective (Latour, 2013, pp. 459, 488-489). 
While I will touch upon these conditions again in our discussion of arguments that cross various 
mode of existence, we should first say a few words about the role of felicity and infelicity 
conditions in Latour’s account, for these bear particular importance for the discussion at hand. 
 
 3. Felicity and infelicity conditions 
 
Drawing upon the work of J. L. Austin, Latour takes up the idea of felicity and infelicity 
conditions as a way of affirming and contrasting “very different types of veridiction without 
reducing them to a single model” (Latour, 2013, p. 18). On Latour’s account, each mode of 
existence will have its own unique veridiction conditions that will determine what is to count as 
true or false, good and bad, better or worse, etc., within each mode (Latour, 2013, pp. 53-54). 
This means that the veridiction conditions that hold within one mode will not hold in the same 
exact manner (and in fact may not hold at all) within another mode. Thus while each mode will 
have its own standards of veridiction, it would be infelicitous to apply the standards operant 
within one mode to another mode, for each mode of existence is “incommensurable” with the 
others (Latour, 2013, p. 382). Attempting to apply the veridiction conditions of one mode of 
existence to another will generally result in what Latour calls (building upon the work of Gilbert 
Ryle) a category mistake, that is, a second-order or “second-degree” “mistake of direction” 
where one becomes disoriented as it were not because you don’t have a compass, but because the 
place in which you are now situated requires a very different kind of compass or orientation 
device than the one you are using (Latour, 2013, pp. 48-55). According to Latour, each mode of 
existence has its own interpretive key and failing to shift from one key to another when crossing 
from one mode to another will likely leave you talking at cross purposes with those who are 
properly attuned to the veridiction conditions of that mode, making you feel out of place or off 
key as it were. We see this kind of category mistake, claims Latour, whenever someone attempts 
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to apply the veridiction conditions appropriate to the mode of Reference (i.e., knowledge), for 
example, to the modes of Politics, Law, or Morality, scolding, ridiculing or condemning those 
operating within these other modes for not living up to the veridiction standards appropriate to 
the judging mode. 
 This raises the interesting and important question of how we are able to recognize that we 
are out of tune in the first place, for wouldn’t such recognition imply the existence of a 
metalanguage that traverses all the modes? Latour responds here by identifying another mode 
call the Prepositional mode of existence whose primary function is to alert one to any shifts in 
interpretive key and to pre-position one to the new veridiction conditions that will follow without 
at the same time imposing its own veridiction conditions on the modes being signalled. Put 
simply, the Prepositional mode helps one to become attuned to the presence of another mode 
without specifying the veridiction conditions that will follow (which one must learn from within 
the mode being signalled by becoming properly attuned to that mode). In this sense Prepositions 
seem akin to what Jean-Luc Marion (2004) calls the purely denotative, self-effacing functions of 
an Icon, which rather than representing the other in its own terms merely presents the other as it 
is in its own manner of being (p. 77). Since the gesturing function of Prepositions works 
precisely by not imposing any veridiction conditions on the mode to which it alerts us, then it 
makes it possible to apprehend or recognize other modes as having their own interpretive key 
without at the same time serving as a universal ground for judging those other modes, thereby 
preserving the radical pluralism of Latour’s framework. We will return to the important role of 
the Prepositional mode later in the discussion. 
 To conclude this section, felicity and infelicity conditions are important because they 
serve to protect, preserve, and advance the various modes of existence, each of which enables, 
defends, and advances important values that are specific to each mode. Infelicity conditions 
undermine the stability and ontological dignity of a given mode, threatening the unique values 
that are enabled and engendered by the mode in question. The best way of coming to recognize 
and appreciate the ontological dignity of a given mode and its unique values, on Latour’s 
account, is either: 1) By regarding it from within the Prepositional mode, whose veridiction 
condition is marked by a special standard of ‘neutrality’ that works to present (or make present) 
other modes in a manner that emphasizes their place as one mode among many (a condition that 
emphasizes the pluralistic nature of being where no one mode is privileged over another), or 2) 
By becoming fully attuned to and immersed within the veridiction conditions constitutive of the 
mode in question, a process that will enable one to see the world from within that modal 
perspective or point of view.  
 
4. Illustrating some modal perspectives: Reference, law, politics, and ethics 
 
The pluralistic character of Latour’s account is perhaps best illustrated by outlining the 
veridiction conditions of a select sample of the various modes of existence. In An Inquiry into 
Modes of Existence Latour identifies fifteen distinct modes of existence, but claims that there are 
likely many more modes beyond these, perhaps indefinitely more. For the purposes of this paper 
we will focus on four modes that are often discussed within the general field of Argumentation: 
Reference, Law, Politics, and Ethics. As I hope to show, while each mode has its own unique 
veridiction conditions, this does not seem to preclude the possibility of arguments or argument 
forms crossing over from one mode to another. The key factor in determining the legitimacy of 
such crossings is whether or not the arguments or argument forms in question are felicitous or 
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infelicitous for the mode in question. It is only when arguments or argument forms become 
infelicitous, threatening the integrity and stability of the mode in question that they become most 
problematic, a situation we ought to avoid out of respect for the dignity of the mode in question 
and the distinct yet important values it engenders and protects. 
 
4.1. The mode of being-Referentially 
 
The distinct alteration that marks the mode of being-Referentially or Reference is the 
establishment of “chains of reference” that are aimed at disclosing or accessing “remote beings.” 
Chains of reference are comprised of all the diverse elements needed to access remote beings, an 
informative relation that can only be established and sustained through the bringing together of a 
diverse network of conditions. Thus in the case of a laboratory, for example, the chains of 
reference will include everything from the scientists and technicians who are seeking the 
information in question, to the buildings, institutions, administrators, lawyers, suppliers, couriers, 
and so on needed to construct and sustain the laboratory work required to access remote beings in 
an epistemically informative manner. All these elements together constitute a network of 
conditions that, gathered together as they are, constitute the Referential chain through which we 
secure a connection to the remote beings we are investigating or seeking to know. These 
networked chains of Reference function by enabling the instauration of what Latour calls 
“immutable mobiles,” i.e., constants which I interpret as including such things as ‘maps,’ 
‘forms,’ ‘concepts,’ ‘rules,’ ‘laws,’ ‘theories,’ and so on, that enable the organization, transfer, 
accumulation, synthesis, classification, and testing of information in the form of “equipped and 
rectified knowledge” (Latour, 2013, pp. 75-77, 107). Importantly such immutable mobiles don’t 
pre-exist their chains of Reference but are instaurated alongside such chains, coming into being 
and becoming more refined, precise, detailed, articulated, and so on as the chains of Reference 
are strengthened and lengthened. Thus, in the case of a map, for example, it will become more 
precise, exact, detailed, and so on as the chains of Reference through which it is instaurated, e.g., 
the signposts, landmarks, elevations, distances, and so on, are more securely and thoroughly set 
out or established.  
Immutable mobiles are not the only things instaurated through the work of constructing 
chains of Reference, for the very sense of ourselves as knowing-subjects set against a world of 
objects-known is another important outcome or by-product of such chains, a way of being-in or 
relating-to the collective that itself only arises through the work of such chains, where “both are 
products arising from the lengthening and strengthening of the chain” (Latour, 2013, p. 80). The 
unique sense of ‘objectivity’ that is characteristic of this Referential way of being-in or relating-
to the collective becomes reinforced and strengthened as the chains of Reference to remote 
beings “lengthen and thicken.” Importantly the sense of ‘objectivity’ associated with this 
Referential way of being does not pre-exist the search for knowledge as a kind of transcendental 
precondition of inquiry, but is itself an outcome or product of the complex chains of Reference 
that give rise to equipped and rectified knowledge (Latour, 2013, pp. 90-92). “The more these 
chains lengthen, thicken, and become more instrumented, the more “there is” objectivity and the 
more “there is” objective knowledge that circulates in the world, available to speakers who want 
to plug into it or subscribe to it” (Latour, 2013, p. 90). It follows that objective knowledge in this 
equipped and rectified sense will always be a matter of degrees so that one can be more or less 
knowledgeable regarding a given class of remote beings depending on one’s familiarity with and 
involvement in the complex chains of Reference engendering the knowledge in question. Part of 
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the veridiction conditions of the Referential mode is the requirement that knowledge claims be 
supported (or at least supportable) by chains of Reference that enable access to the remote beings 
in question—no chain of Reference, no equipped and rectified knowledge. 
The veridiction conditions for the mode of being-Referentially will be the various 
standards and measures that define what is to qualify as equipped and rectified knowledge. This 
will include issues relating to whether or not the chains of Reference supporting the knowledge 
being claimed are well made or poorly made, e.g., has the laboratory experiment been well 
designed or poorly designed, have all the relevant variables been controlled for, is the sample 
size statistically significant, are the test results reliable, repeatable, and so on. It is these more 
epistemically oriented considerations that will be most important here, for they will determine 
what is to count as knowledge in this Referential sense.  
A central feature of ‘objectivity’ in the mode of being-Referentially is the sense that one’s 
viewpoint is never limited to the particular context in which one happens to be situated, but that 
one can view the world from any perspective as it were, free from any determinate limits. In 
Latour’s account, this Referential sense of objectivity is not ‘the view from nowhere’ as many in 
the tradition have mistakenly claimed, but what I would call the view from anywhere, a capacity 
to access beings of any kind anywhere through the mediating, connecting relations of chains of 
Reference. Further, the sense that regardless of how long or strong our Referential chains may be 
we never seem to bring them to any state of epistemic completeness (a sense that Latour claims 
underlies the endless lamentations about thing-in-themselves within the tradition of Kantian-
styled Critique) does not point to a failing or limitation inherent in the work of establishing 
chains of Reference, but speaks instead of the pluralistic ontology in which Reference itself is 
situated:    
 
the expression “objective knowledge” (provided that it is materialized) designates 
a progression, an access route, a movement that will cross paths with other types 
of movements to which it cannot be reduced and that it cannot reduce, either. This 
impression that there is always something more than what is known in the thing 
known does not refer at all to the unknowable (the complaint of Critique is in no 
way justified) but to the presence of other modes whose equal dignity 
EPISTEMOLOGY, despite all its efforts, has never allowed to be recognized. 
Knowledge can grasp everything, go everywhere, but in its own mode. It is not a 
DOMAIN, whose expansion has to be limited or authorized. It is a network that 
traces its own particular trajectory, alongside other, differently qualified 
trajectories, which it never ceases to crisscross. (Latour, 2013, p. 85) 
  
Within the mode of being-Referentially something will be felicitous or infelicitous 
depending on the extent to which it either enables and advances the possibility of equipped and 
rectified knowledge, or stands as an impediment to such knowledge (Latour, 2013, p. 92). The 
felicity conditions of Reference will thereby include anything that would enable, maintain, 
protect, or advance our access to information about remote beings, and anything that would 
disable, prohibit or otherwise interfere with or limit such access would be infelicitous. An 
example might be the establishment of prohibitions against certain forms of inquiry, or if we 
decided, for example, to put a halt to any further inquiry and rest entirely our laurals.  
 
PHILIP ROSE 
7 
Access to remote beings depends, as we have seen, on the paving constituted by 
multiple intermediaries and on the rapid but always precarious shifting of a 
constant. … Scientists can obviously decide to limit themselves to the final result 
alone, but then they will have dried up the resource that would allow them to gain 
access to new beings and to trace new paths—and they will quickly lose access, 
because they won’t know how to maintain the roads and the means that have 
already been established. (Latour, 2013, p. 126) 
 
We see such loss of knowledge portrayed in apocalyptic novels, movies and games where a 
person might live in a world filled with relics of automobiles, computers and other complex 
technologies but lack the knowledge needed to make them work, or where a person might be able 
to cite the conclusion of complex chain of references, e.g., E=MC(2) without knowing explicitly 
what it means or what to do with it. Insofar as such people might be said to have knowledge of 
the things in question then, following Leibniz or Peirce the most we could say is that such 
knowledge would be very confused or vague. Included in such infelicitous conditions is what 
Latour calls the tendency for some to limit all talk to what he refers to as “straight talk.” Such 
posturing purports to reduce the complex and diverse conditions underlying equipped and 
rectified knowledge to its conclusions, as if the purely formalist nature of the outcome could 
somehow stand on its own independent of the conditions that both enable and sustain it. Such 
posturing “wants to imitate the results without having to encumber oneself with imitating the 
burdensome process as well” (Latour, 2013, pp. 126-131).  
 In what Latour calls our Modernist mindset, it is the sense of objectivity associated with 
the mode of being Referentially that is often taken as the standard against which all other claims, 
practices, realities, and so on, are to be judged, where anything that doesn’t live up to the 
Referential standards of equipped and rectified knowledge is typically denigrated as ‘merely 
subjective,’ merely linguistic,’ ‘mere value,’ and so on (Latour, 2013, p. 72). Under our 
‘Modernist’ mindset it is the Referential sense of ‘objectivity’ that has come to define what 
counts as objectivity as such, a view which Latour’s pluralistic ontology calls into question in a 
serious and potentially revolutionary manner. For on Latour’s account objectivity does not have 
the univocal sense ascribed to it by the Modernist tradition, but is much more of a multivocal 
notion whose meaning or sense varies from mode to mode. 
 
4.2 .The mode of being-Politically 
 
The distinct alteration that marks the mode of being-Politically or Politics is a trajectory of 
collecting and assembling that takes the form of a self-engendering circle, a process of 
discussion, debate, articulation of interests, and decision-making that is never ending, never 
complete. In the mode of being-Politically the multitude come together in gatherings or 
assemblies so that the ‘many’ become ‘one,’ in the sense that our sense of ourselves as “I” is 
accompanied at the same time by a sense of ourselves as “we,” as a member of a group, a 
community, or a people. Alongside the relation of many-to-one is the converse relation of ‘one-
into-many’ expressed as a growing sense of individual autonomy among the community’s 
members. It is this dual movement, this dual articulation of many-into-one and one-into-many 
that most distinguishes and defines the Political mode of existence (Latour, 2013, p. 350). It 
follows that it is not any old collective or group that qualifies as Political in its fullest, truest, 
richest sense, for the manner in which the assembly is formed and maintained is vital, even 
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constitutive. To count as Political in its proper or truest sense the process of assembling must be 
such as to engender the instauration of individuals as citizens, that is, individuals for whom the 
sense of community membership or “we” is accompanied at the same time by a newly 
engendered sense of autonomy and freedom as “I,” that is, as someone whose interests and 
values as an individual count as one alongside all the other individuals who constitute that 
community. Hence, just as the Referential mode instaurates the conditions of ‘knowing subject’ 
and ‘object known’ as a Referential way of being-in or relating-to the collective, so too the mode 
of being-Politically instaurates new ways of being-in or relating-to the colective that take the 
dual form of ‘community’ and ‘autonomous individual,’ a complex condition of engenderment 
that Latour characterizes as the “delicate ecology of freedom” (Latour, 2013, pp. 331-332). Just 
as the Referential sense of ‘knowing subject’ and ‘object known’ do not pre-exist their 
instauration through chains of Reference but are co-produced by them, so too the Political senses 
of ‘community member’ and ‘autonomous individual’ do not pre-exist the self-engendering circle 
of Political life, but are produced by the encircling reprise of being-Politically. Autonomy and 
community are not to be taken as given here, but as realities that come-to-be, that are won 
gradually and by degrees through the difficult and challenging work of the self-engendering 
Political circle (Latour, 2013, pp. 345, 372-373).  
Because the instauration of the sense of community membership in the Political mode is 
accompanied at the same time by the instauration of the sense of individual autonomy, then the 
self-engendering circle of Political life will necessarily give rise to two counterbalancing realities 
with their own distinct tendencies. On the one hand there will be the tendency for people to see 
themselves as members of a community with shared aims, visions, beliefs, and so on, and on the 
other there will be the tendency for people to see themselves as autonomous individuals 
struggling to express and articulate their own particular interests, concerns, and so on. The result 
is a self-engendering circle of activity whose aim at assembling and unifying is necessarily and at 
the same time accompanied by (and ought to be so) a way of being-autonomously that will resist 
any efforts at unification to which these Politically autonomous citizens do not freely assent. 
Thus a central and constitutively vital feature of Political life will be the never ending demand 
that the work of gathering and assembling into communities of autonomous individuals be taken 
up and renewed again with no end in sight (Latour, 2013, pp. 133-134). This continuous and 
never ending reprise of the self-engendering circle is an essential aspect of the Political mode of 
being, one that plays a crucial role in determining the felicity and infelicity conditions of the 
mode of being-Politically. 
 From these essential differences it follows that speaking well within the Political mode 
will be very different from speaking well in the mode of Reference, for Politics is not aimed at 
securing and advancing equipped and rectified knowledge, but at something entirely distinct and 
markedly its own, namely, the instauration of autonomous individuals in freely assembled 
communities. Unlike the veridiction conditions of Reference, which center around the conditions 
needed to access remote beings, the veridiction conditions of Politics center around “the 
particular type of reason with which public life is charged,” a space of reasons that is oriented 
not around the growth of equipped and rectified knowledge, but around “MATTERS OF 
CONCERN,” that is, issues, controversies, disagreements, and so on, that call us together in a 
manner that will allow us to deal with them as individual members of an assembly or community 
(Latour, 2013, pp. 333-337). The interrelated ends of community and autonomy that are central 
to Political life will thus require a much wider variety of ways of speaking well than might be 
found within the mode of Reference, for such Political speaking will require multitudinous ways 
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of circling around the many interests, concerns, and issues that arise, engaging and speaking to 
each of its participants in a manner that enables them to willingly take up and assent to the vision 
or compromise engendered as something of their own. (Latour, 2013, p. 341) This requires a 
special kind of skill, one that is capable of remaining sensitive and adaptable to a variety of 
contexts and circumstances across a wide variety of individual expressions of interest and 
concern. It requires a manner of speaking that Latour characterizes as “a truth of curves,” a form 
of language that is best fitted to satisfying the challenging demands of advancing the dual values 
of community and autonomy. Such speaking requires extreme “freedom of movement,” 
flexibility, and a skillfulness in the use of words that must remain unconstrained by any of the 
other forms of veridiction (Latour, 2013, p. 347-348). It might be the case, for example, that 
some arguments forms that are permissible within Politics would be disavowed within 
Reference, but this wouldn’t make one any better or more rigorous than the other, it would 
simply be an expression of an essential difference that preserves and protects the special dignity 
and value of each mode. 
The difference between the Political and Referential is expressed historically in the 
tension between episteme and Rhetoric (or logos and mythos), a tension in which the Rhetorician 
is typically criticized and chastised for not living up to the standards of ‘Truth’ in its epistemic or 
Referential sense. Latour, however, reverses this traditional argument, chastising Socrates for 
portraying the Political as a corrupted form of Reference, a category mistake whose effects still 
echo throughout the Western tradition. It is not Socrates, claims Latour, who most recognizes and 
acknowledges the value and dignity of the Political, but the Sophists whose mastery of the art of 
speaking in curves and circles serves as a classical model of what it means to speak well within 
the Political mode, a point that is reiterated in Aristotle’s recognition of Rhetoric as a subject 
matter that has a dignity and value of its own (Latour, 2013, pp. 262-263, 273-274, 349).  
 It follows that the felicity and infelicity conditions of Politics will reside in the extent to 
which one’s manner of speaking satisfies and advances the dual requirements of community and 
autonomy. Put crudely anything that works to secure, maintain, and advance the conditions of 
community and autonomy through the continuous, unending reprise of the Political circle will be 
felicitous within the Political mode, and anything that works to undermine or threaten the dual 
conditions of community and autonomy or that works to interrupt or stop the continuous reprise 
of the self-engendering circle will be infelicitous within the Political mode (Latour, 2013, pp. 
342, 344, 350, 355). 
 
These beings, too, are “manners of speaking,” in a way; consequently, they too 
become endangered languages once there are no more speakers to speak them 
well. We can understand that it would be enough to ruin all hope for a possible 
civilization if political speech, following the same path as religious speech, were 
lost for good. (Latour, 2013, p. 329) 
 
Included among the infelicitous conditions of Politics is what Latour refers to as “straight talk,” 
for such posturing mistakenly approaches Politics in the Socratic vein as a corrupted form of 
Reference, a corruption that it proposes to reform by bringing what it takes to be the more 
‘literal’ language of episteme as a corrective to the ‘crookedness’ of Political forms of speech. 
But however laudable such efforts may appear, they rest, claims Latour, on a number of very 
troublesome and potentially dangerous category mistakes, including: (a) Failing to recognize 
Politics as a distinct mode unto itself, (b) Failing to properly understand the complex nature of 
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the networks that underlie the epistemic reliability attained within the mode of Reference, and (c) 
Failing to recognize and respect the felicity and infelicity conditions needed to sustain the dignity 
and values unique to the mode of being-Politically. On Latour’s account, being-Politically has a 
dignity of its own that counts for just as much as being-Referentially, for it engenders and 
protects important values that are unique to it and that would be lost if the felicity conditions that 
are central to Politics were threatened or undermined. 
 
4.3. The mode of being-Legally 
 
The distinct alteration that marks the mode of being-Legally or Law is a trajectory that links 
together various cases, decisions, actions, and so on through what is generally referred to as legal 
means. It is widely acknowledged that engaging with the ‘legal world” requires a modal shift of 
some sort, and we generally recognize that a different interpretive stance is required in order to 
“take things legally.” When such a shift has been signalled we recognize that the manner of 
speaking, the ways of judging, even the meanings of terms within the Legal mode will be 
importantly different from other ways of speaking, judging, and so on. As Latour (2013) himself 
puts it, Law “has its own mode of veridiction, certainly different from that of Science, but 
universally acknowledged as capable of distinguishing truth and falsity in its own way” (pp. 358-
359). Importantly, even though most of us who live ‘outside’ the Legal mode have no clear 
understanding of the peculiar trajectory and veridiction conditions operating ‘inside’ the Legal 
system we still widely recognize and acknowledge that there is something distinct and unique 
about Law that requires this kind of Legally oriented modal shift. The Legal case thus serves as a 
good example of the kind of shift that Latour claims takes place whenever we move from mode 
to mode, where speaking ontologically, for example, is recognized as importantly different from 
speaking epistemically, speaking scientifically importantly different from speaking politically, 
and so on. While this is true for all modes, on Latour’s account, we see it more readily in the 
Legal case, allowing it to serve as an exemplar of the kind of modal shift that takes place 
whenever we cross over from mode to mode. The vividness of the Legal case also points to the 
importance of the Prepositional mode, for it is this mode more than anything else that allows us 
to recognize another mode from the ‘outside’ as it were, even though we may not be proficient or 
‘in-the-know’ about what is going on within that mode. 
Viewed from the point of view of Reference, Law is often chastised as being “superficial 
and formal,” but according to Latour (2013), far from being detrimental to Law these are among 
its most important and constitutive features (p. 361). Law works by bringing particular cases or 
facts under principles through the “due diligence” of Legal means, a process that “makes it 
possible to connect enunciators and utterances by invisible threads,” and in the process bring 
about a special kind of continuity between past and present that expresses itself in the general 
notion of Legal responsibility (Latour, 2013, pp. 365-367, 370). Through the connective work of 
Legal means past actions, statements, commitments, etc. are rendered continuous with one’s 
present and future ‘self’ in a way that is Legally binding, engendering that special, extremely 
formal sense of identity that is peculiar to the mode of Law. In its special, continuity-building 
function Law turns out to be the only mode that is inherently and almost exclusively backward 
looking, establishing a special kind of connection between what may be, what is, and what has 
been that instaurates “the miracle of proceeding as though, by particular linkages, we were held 
to what we say and what we do. What you have done, signed, said, promised, given, engages 
you” (Latour, 2013, pp. 369-370). This purely formalistic process is seen as superficial from the 
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point of view of Reference because it neither conveys nor produces information in the 
Referential sense, as equipped and rectified knowledge, and so appears “without content” from 
that point of view (Latour, 2013, p. 370). Nevertheless it is through the continuities established 
within Law that we become ‘legal subjects,’ individuals whose special Legal sense of identity 
establishes connections to and responsibilities for actions and commitments that extend into the 
past, a purely formal yet legally binding sense of identity through which notions of authorship, 
ownership, and so on are established and sustained (Latour, 2013, p. 370). Undermine this form 
of Legal continuity, e.g., by the loss of one’s birth certificate, for example, and your connection 
to the past becomes increasingly tenuous, diminishing your status as a Legal subject. 
 The veridiction conditions peculiar to and constitutive of the mode of being-Legally are 
to be found in the purely formal, procedural requirements associated with due diligence or due 
process in the special, Legal sense of those terms. It is the extent to which arguments follow or 
conform to the standards of due diligence that determines whether they will be considered good 
or bad, better or worse, and so on, within the Legal mode. Thus it is possible that forms of 
argument that may seem tenuous or weak within the modes of Reference or Politics, for example, 
may be perfectly valid within the mode of being-Legally as long as they satisfy the special Legal 
demands of due diligence.  
Arguments, claims, ways of speaking, and so on will be felicitous within Law if they 
protect and preserve its formal, procedural character, whereas conditions that would undermine 
or threaten the purely formal, backward turn of Law’s connective process would be infelicitous 
to that mode. Thus it would be infelicitous to demand that Legal procedures be condemned and 
rejected because they fail to engender equipped and rectified knowledge in the Referential sense 
or because they don’t promote the existence of a healthy, self-engendering circle in the Political 
sense, for such standards and aims have little to do with Legal process (Latour, 2013, p. 364). It 
would be equally infelicitous to expect Legal judgments to be just in a psychological or Moral 
sense, for the Legal sense of justice is importantly distinct from those other notions which, while 
valuable and important in their own right, fall outside the mode of Law as such.  
 
When I require of a judgment rendered in court that it also provide me with the 
closure that would allow me to “get over it,” as it were, I am asking the 
impossible, since the type of closure provided by the legal apparatus in no way 
aims—this becomes painfully clear to me—at offering reparations to my psyche; 
its goal is merely to connect texts with facts and with other texts through the 
intermediary of opinions according to the dizzying itinerary that is qualified, 
though not described, by terms we have already encountered, MEANS or 
procedure. The same thing would be true, moreover, if I expected that a ruling in 
favor of compensating victims would “objectively” establish the truth of the 
matter. The judge, if she is honest, will say that she has settled the “legal truth” 
but not the “objective” truth in the case at hand. If she knows some Latin, as every 
legal professional is prone to do, she will cite the Latin adage according to which 
judgment is pro veritate habetur (“taken as the truth”): neither more nor less. If 
she is something of a philosopher, she will ask that people “stop confusing” the 
legal requirements of truth with the scientific requirements of truth, means with 
proof—and even more with the psychological requirement of intimate 
reparations—not to mentions the social requirement of fairness. “All that,” she 
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will say, “has to be carefully differentiated.” And she will be right. (Latour, 2013, 
p. 54) 
 
We see these kinds of category mistakes, as well as the confusion and disappointment that 
accompanies them, all the time, but calls to reform the mode of Law by making it conform to or 
satisfy the veridication conditions or standards of another mode would be infelicitous to the 
Legal mode of existence and a serious threat to its dignity and the special values it enables, 
secures, and defends. We might advocate on the basis of these other considerations that certain 
laws to be revised, removed, or established, but on Latour’s account we should let the discussion 
of Legal means and due process be handled within the Legal mode in a strictly Legal manner.  
  
4.4. The mode of being-Morally 
 
The distinct alteration that marks the mode of Morality is a trajectory that traces the tension 
inherent in relations between means and ends, a tension that is intrinsic to the very ontology of 
being-as-other. As already noted, since the existence of any being can only be sustained through 
“the supreme duty to explore through what other beings it must pass to subsist, to earn its 
subsistence” (Latour, 2013, p. 454), then existence necessarily involves existing through or by 
way of a relation to some other. Such a relation gives rise to an ambiguity and tension between 
means and ends that becomes the principal point of attention within the mode of being-Morally. 
In fact it is the condition of being troubled by the ambiguity and tension in relations between 
means and ends that stands as a defining feature of the mode of being-Morally, for it is the 
troubled nature of the Moral mode of being that moves one to try and determine the basis of this 
condition and to seek some way to resolve it in a Morally acceptable manner. 
 
Now, if we have properly understood the treasure of alterities that being-as-other 
keeps in its bosom, an enigma is posed to every existent: “If I exist only through 
the other, which of us then is the end and which the means? I, who have to pass by 
way of it, am I its means or is it mine? Am I the end or is it my end? This is the 
problem of the FOURTH GROUP that we shall no longer be able to escape when 
we start to follow the course of action that attaches long chains of means and ends; 
and the longer the chain, the more tormenting the questions. (Latour, 2013, p. 454) 
 
In the mode of being-Morally the tension between means and ends that is inherent within the 
ontology of being-as-other presses upon one as a sense of anxiety, a Morally distinct feeling of 
responsibility that is importantly different from the highly formal sense of responsibility 
associated with Law, for this Moral sense arises from the very nature of the relations of existence 
as such and the beings involved in those relations (Latour, 2013, p. 457) This special, almost 
existential feeling of Moral responsibility plays itself out in 
 
the reprise of scruples about the optimal distribution of ends and means. If every 
existent remakes the world in its own way and according to its own viewpoint, its 
supreme value is of course that of existing on its own, as Whitehead says, but it 
can in no case shed the anxiety of having left in the shadows, like so many mere 
means, the multitude of those, the others, that have allowed it to exist and about 
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which it is never very sure that they are not its finality. And it is obviously not a 
question of human beings alone. (Latour, 2013, p. 455) 
 
The scruples that are inherent in and constitutive of the mode of being-Morally compel us to “ask 
questions after the fact,” that is, after we have secured the conditions of existence in some 
relevant sense. Inherent in such questioning are concerns about whether we may have acted 
wrongly and could have acted better, a process that calls on us to more thoroughly examine the 
nature of the means/ends relations in which we are involved in the hope of finding more optimal 
ways of securing and protecting the inherent value of all involved as both means and ends in-
themselves (Latour, 2013, p. 459). In its initial phase such questioning calls on us to discover the 
source of our unease, a Moral call to actively and self-critically examine our past actions in order 
to disclose any wrongs we may have committed.  
 
It does not suffice to be simply troubled, vaguely uneasy: we have to commit to a 
new movement of exploration in order to verify the overall quality of all the links. 
Here we have a unique requirement… What torments us is the commitment to a 
new adventure of verification of the thing about which the first scruple was just a 
fuzzy starting point. This is what defines the truth of the moral sense, or rather its 
gradual validation. The particular, almost technical pass of morality lies in giving 
itself the means to go still further in the groping that makes it possible to validate 
or falsify what the initial uneasiness had only sensed. (Latour, 2013, p. 460) 
 
As noted, in the effort to resolve these concerns the mode of being-Morally looks for some way 
to optimize the complex of values, both as means and ends, a hope that Latour admits is an 
impossible task.  
 
Everything must be combined insofar as possible even though everything is 
incommensurable. It is necessary to reach the optimum even though there is no 
way to optimize that optimum by any calculation at all, since, by definition, the 
beings whose relations of ends and means must be measured do not and must not 
have any common measure, because each one of them can also be counted as an 
end. (Here, at least, Kant succeeded in registering moral quality, even though he 
reserved it to humans alone.) Goods and evils cannot be weighed against one 
another, and yet they must be weighed. (Latour, 2013, p. 461) 
 
The task is made impossible by the very nature of the conditions of existence per se, for no 
matter how careful and exhaustive one’s critical scrutiny may be the sheer complexity of the 
relations of means and ends in which one is involved will always call for more, leaving one 
haunted by the worry that one could always have tried a little harder or done a little more.  
 
When you set our as a moral being, everything is yours, everything concerns you, 
preoccupies you, worries you… The originality of this mode of being lies right 
here: it knows no limits… As soon as it sees a limit, it has scruples about not 
trying to surpass it. By limiting itself, by believing itself to be quits, is it making a 
terrible mistake? (Latour 2013, p. 461) 
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This sense that there is always more that one could and should have done, beings whose value 
one might have dismissed too rashly, values or ends that one may have overlooked, and so on, is 
an essential ingredient of the Moral mode of being, a sense that the door should never be close 
too quickly or completely no matter how thorough, how exhaustive one’s efforts at resolving the 
tension between means and ends may have been. Such a standpoint involves trying “ever subtler 
experiments to bring the greatest number to share in the reprise of the optimum,” an endless task 
that one nevertheless feels compelled to attempt no matter how impossible, how ‘Sisyphean’ it 
might appear (Latour, 2013, p. 464). 
 The veridiction conditions of Morality have to do with determining how well, i.e., how 
thoroughly, carefully, fairly, etc., one is able to explore the conditions that underlie one’s sense 
of unease in the treatment of others. Put simply, there are going to be better and worse ways of 
following through on one’s moral scruples, better and worse ways of responding to the special 
sense of Moral responsibility that is central to the mode of being-Morally, and one’s standing as 
a Moral being will be judged by how well one lives up to those standards (Latour, 2013, p. 460). 
It follows that arguments, claims, and other conditions will be Morally felicitous if they enable 
or, better yet, invite the difficult work of moral scrutiny, whereas conditions that discourage such 
scrutiny or, worse, bring it to a halt will be Morally infelicitous. Thus, attempts to reduce Moral 
actions to a purely formal process of calculation as found in some forms of Utilitarianism and 
Economics will be infelicitous to the Moral mode of being, for such shortcuts serve to undermine 
and threaten the very conditions that are essential to and constitutive of a Moral way of being 
(Latour, 2013, pp. 460-467). The same holds true for attempts to ground Moral issues and 
concerns in a set of universal principles or absolute laws such as we find in the philosophy of 
Kant or Kantian-based theories, for such efforts give rise to what Latour calls a kind of moralism 
that, rather than enabling and inviting the difficult work of wrestling with one’s scruples, 
function instead to distance oneself from such concerns by bringing the entire process of moral 
examination and moral justification to a categorically absolute conclusion or end (Latour, 2013, 
p. 456). Such moralism is a prime example of what Latour calls bad transcendence. 
 
As with each mode, re rediscover the opposition between good and bad 
TRANSCENDENCE: carefully preserving the distance between the 
commensurable and incommensurable makes for transcendence; extracting 
oneself from situations to see the “external” viewpoint that alone makes it possible 
to “judge” situations that otherwise would remain merely “factual” is the classic 
example of bad transcendence that tips you outside experience, or, better, outside 
moral experimentation, and leads to MORALISM. (Latour, 2013, p. 462) 
 
Such Kantian-styled moralism (and it comes in many forms) is likely the result of attempting to 
treat moral issues using the standards or veridiction conditions of other modes of existence such 
as Reference or Law, regarding values as if there were akin to remote beings that we could come 
to ‘know’ through some purely formal Referential process, or regarding moral concerns as akin 
to Legal cases that can be judged by bringing them under some prior principle. On Latour’s 
account most of the work in meta-ethics and ethical theory would likely be guilty of these kinds 
of category mistakes and, rather than advancing the conditions of moral life as their proponents 
profess, they actually work to undermine the integrity and dignity of the conditions necessary to 
being-Morally, threatening the special values of care, concern, responsibility, and so on, that are 
engendered within that mode.   
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5. The crossing of modes 
 
Latour’s ontology of being-as-other implies that there must be considerable interaction between 
the various modes. Such interaction is signalled both by the extent to which beings instaurated in 
one mode are taken up within others, and by the prevalence of category mistakes resulting from 
interpreting claims, arguments, and so on in the wrong modal key. Latour refers to the place 
where two modes intersect as a crossing, and it is here that much of the confusion, passion, and 
interesting cross-fertilization that occurs between modes takes place. 
It is important to recall here that no mode is universal or ontologically basic and that no 
mode is reducible to another. To be is to always to be in some mode or other with the Leibnizean 
or Whiteheadean consequence that each mode serves as a particular perspective on the collective, 
a perspective that is unique to and constitutive of that mode. Since each mode will necessarily 
view the world through its peculiar lens then we will inevitably tend to interpret, assess, evaluate, 
and judge all things through the operating conditions that are constitutive of the mode in which 
we happen to be immersed. Thus a person immersed within the mode of being-Morally will tend 
to see moral issues everywhere, while someone immersed within the mode of being-Legally will 
tend to interpret everything in purely formal, procedural terms, and so on.  
Given the highly relational, context dependent nature of this pluralistic ontology it would 
seem to follow that claims and arguments too will be highly context or domain sensitive so that 
how a given claim or argument ‘looks,’ i.e., how it is taken, interpreted, assessed, and so on, will 
depend upon the nature of the mode within which one is operating. Thus a person immersed 
within the mode of Reference will tend to judge all claims or arguments against the epistemic 
standards of equipped and rectified knowledge, while someone immersed within the mode of 
Politics will tend to view the same claims or arguments in terms of their ‘practical’ efficacy in 
securing the conditions of autonomy and community within the self-engendering circle of 
Political life. It would also seem to follow that conditions that are of vital or great importance 
within one mode may be irrelevant, perhaps even detrimental within another. Thus the 
Referential requirements for setting up a valid experiment or constructing a valid inductive 
argument, for example, may have very little importance for the examination of means/ends 
relations within the mode of being-Morally, and the purely formal, procedural requirements of a 
well-constructed Legal argument may turn out to be irrelevant, perhaps even detrimental to the 
formation of a well-constructed Political argument. Put crudely, each mode will have its own 
dignity and value, as well as its own perspectival ‘bias’ if you will, an inevitability of which we 
should be mindful when immersed within a mode and when crossing from mode to mode. I place 
the term ‘bias’ in scare quotes here because the very notion of a bias presupposes a ‘non-biased’ 
standard or reference point from which the biased condition diverges in some way, but on the 
account outlined here there can be no universal, non-biased reference point, for every mode, 
every viewpoint will always privilege itself. The one possible exception here, if it can be called 
that, is the mode of being-Prepositionally, for this is the only mode whose distinct alteration 
involves alerting one to the interpretive key of other modes. It is the extent to which a 
Preposition prepares you, not for itself, but for another mode that marks its unique veridiction 
condition (Latour, 2013, pp. 58-62). It is the special form of ‘neutrality’ that is peculiar to the 
mode of being-Prepositionally that allows it to serve as the vantage point from which to examine 
and describe the other modes, a point that Latour admits is the vantage point adopted in his own 
work. 
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Thus while I have spoken all along of an inquiry and even of a questionnaire, it is 
not in the mode of knowledge that I claim to be working. The term “inquiry” has 
to be taken in a plurimodal sense whose object is to preserve the diversity of 
modes. Can we call this approach “empirical philosophy”? I am not sure, given 
how indifferent philosophy has become to the task of description. Experimental 
metaphysics? Cosmopolitics? Comparative anthropology? Practical ontology? 
Mailman Cheval will surely have made more than one discovery along this way 
that can serve as an emblem for this enterprise. To situate this reprise of the 
rationalist adventure, but to mark clearly that it will not take place under the 
auspices of Double Click, I have entrusted it to the term diplomacy. Values, if they 
are not to disappear, have to be diplomatically negotiated. A practical 
RELATIONISM that seeks, in a protocol of relationship-building and 
benchmarking, to avoid the ravages of RELATIVISM—that absolutism of a single 
point of view. (Latour, 2013, p. 481). 
 
The modal standpoint of diplomat, a position of ‘neutrality’ that enables a purely descriptive 
point of view with respect to the other modes, is central to and constitutive of the Prepositional 
mode of being. It is not the perspective of the ‘knowing-subject’ engendered within Reference (a 
sense of ‘objectivity’ that allows one to adopt the perspective of the ‘object-known’) but a form 
of objectivity as a special sense of ‘neutrality’ that signals or opens one up to the distinct 
presence and requirements of another mode. It follows of course that this paper has also been 
written in the diplomatic mode of being-Prepositionally, and hence is an expression of the 
neutral, descriptive objectivity peculiar to that mode.   
   
6. Can arguments and argument forms cross from mode to mode? 
 
The simple answer to the question of whether arguments and argument forms can cross between 
modes would seem to be ‘Yes,’ as long as the arguments or argument forms in question are not 
infelicitous to the mode in question. Some examples may help illustrate the point. For the 
purposes of this paper we shall assume that the arguments outlined have been well supported 
following the standards or veridiction conditions peculiar to the mode in which they were 
developed so that each argument is regarded as a good argument within its originating mode.   
 
Example A) A series of carefully constructed chains of Reference, e.g., field studies, 
experiments, etc. reliably supports the following conclusions:   
 
1) A virus is responsible for a class of deformities in newborn humans. 
2) Mosquitos are the principal means for the transmission of the virus in 
question. 
3) Limiting the interactions between pregnant women and mosquitos in infected 
regions should help prevent the spread of these deformities in human infants.  
 
One can easily envisage this argument being taken up and crossing over into the Political mode 
as part of a persuasive argument for implementing policies and practices aimed at reducing 
interactions between pregnant women and mosquitos. Such Political use of the argument would 
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not appear to be infelicitous to the mode of Reference because it does not challenge the epistemic 
reliability of the argument but trusts it, drawing upon its Referential authority as a reliable 
knowledge claim to enhance its persuasiveness within the Political mode. Such use would also 
not seem to be infelicitous within the Political mode either as long as the argument was not used 
to undermine the dual conditions of autonomy and community in the broad sense outlined above. 
If, however, the argument was used to try and justify moving towards an authoritarian police 
state then it could work to undermine the dignity and values intrinsic to the Political mode of 
being. 
 We can imagine the same Referential argument being taken up within the Legal mode for 
the purposes of establishing ownership of a patent on the testing procedures used for detecting 
the virus in question. Again such Legal use would not seem to be infelicitous to the mode of 
Reference for it doesn’t challenge the Referential status of the argument but trusts it, taking it up 
as a means of establishing the sense of authorship that is central to the Legal mode. Such use 
would also not seem to be infelicitous to the Legal mode as long as it does not threaten the 
requirements of due process that are constitutive of the Legal mode of being.  
  
Example B) A Legal case that follows the careful, painstaking work of due process leads to the 
following conclusions: 
 
1) Circumstantial evidence in a criminal sexual assault trial points to the guilt of 
the male accused. 
2) Factual evidence also points to the guilt of the accused.  
3) The testimony of key female witnesses in the trial is judged to be unreliable. 
4) The male charged with the sexual offenses in question is declared not guilty. 
 
We can imagine this Legal argument being taken up within the Moral mode as a worry or 
concern that a certain group of people, in this case female victims of sexual assault, are not being 
treated in a way that is respectful of their dignity and their value as ends in-themselves. Such a 
crossing would not be infelicitous to the Legal mode as long as the validity of the original 
judgment was respected and accepted, but if the original Legal judgment were to be overturned 
because of its failure to live up to the Moral standards of veridiction then that would appear to be 
a category mistake that could indeed be infelicitous to the Legal mode of being and the values it 
engenders and protects.  
We can imagine this same argument being taken up within the Political mode (prompted 
perhaps by the Moral concerns noted above) as a call to reform the legal system by amending the 
laws as they already exist or putting in place new laws that might promote a greater sense of 
inclusiveness and autonomy for victims of sexual assault. Again such a Political crossing would 
not appear to be infelicitous to the Legal mode as long as the original Legal judgment was 
respected and preserved, and while such a crossing might well result in the reform of existing 
laws or the introduction of new laws this would still be okay as long as future cases under the 
new or reformed laws are judged following the standards of due process appropriate to the Legal 
mode.  
We might imagine this Legal argument being taken up in a very different way within 
Reference, not by taking up the particular argument but its argument form. We can imagine, for 
example, someone within the mode of Reference assuming that the since the argument is valid 
Legally then its argument form should also be valid Referentially, where the conditions of 
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validity within one mode are presumed to be preserved when transferred to another mode. While 
this kind of move might not be infelicitous to Law, it could well be infelicitous to the mode of 
Reference, for such a move could actually threaten the veridiction conditions of Reference by 
weakening or undermining the standards of equipped and rectified knowledge in the strong 
Referential sense of those terms. If so, then such formal crossings should be undertaken with 
great care with special consideration being given to the felicity and infelicity conditions of the 
mode or modes in question. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
If we take seriously the modal pluralism outlined here then this might have important 
implications for the study of Argumentation. First it would seem to imply that the proper study of 
arguments and argumentation requires that we approach, examine, and assess arguments in the 
interpretive key appropriate to the mode in which they were developed or employed. Thus when 
assessing Political arguments, for example, we should be careful not to judge them using the 
criteria and standards appropriate to a different mode such as Reference, declaring such 
arguments to be invalid because they fail to satisfy the Referential veridiction conditions 
associated with equipped and rectified knowledge. We should also be careful when taking up 
arguments or argument forms from other modes, making sure we do so in a way that is mindful 
and respectful of the felicity and infelicity conditions of the modes in question. Similar 
considerations apply to our use of and appeal to standards of objectivity, for while this kind of 
pluralistic, relationist account avoids the pitfalls of relativism by affirming a strong sense of 
objectivity internal to a given mode, objectivity in general is still multivocal rather than univocal 
and it is imperative that we keep the modally-relative sense of the term always in mind. We 
would therefore need to be very careful when trying to extend a sense of objectivity from mode 
to mode.  
 Second, this kind of pluralistic account might also have important implications for the 
study of argument forms, for it could well be that different argument forms have their origin in 
different modes of existence. If so then this could have revolutionary consequences for the study 
of argumentation in general, for much of the work in argumentation seems to presuppose either 
that all argument forms are reducible to some commonly shared verdiction conditions (e.g., 
universal ‘logical’ standards), or that everything is relative in a radical subjectivist or cultural 
sense, with no middle ground as it were. Put crudely, it is usually regarded either that all 
arguments can be assessed from a single, universal logical standpoint, or that any appeal to such 
standards is ultimately arbitrary in some fundamental sense. On this traditional account, 
argument validity is typically assumed to be univocal, with a single set of validity conditions 
taken to apply across all argument forms. On the pluralistic account outlined here, however, it 
seems highly plausible that some argument forms might actually have originated or been 
developed within ontologically distinct modes of existence. If so, then the validity conditions for 
judging argument forms might vary in important ways from mode to mode, with validity itself 
being multivocal rather than univocal. It is plausible, for example, that deductive forms of 
argument could have arisen within the Legal mode of existence as a way of working out the 
implications that might follow from bringing a particular case under a given principle. Such non-
epistemic origins could be important for understanding certain capacities or limits that might be 
inherent within that argument form. It might help explain, for example, why Deductive forms of 
argument seem to add so little to our knowledge when used within the mode of being-
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Referentially, serving more as a method of explication rather than a means for the amplification 
or growth of knowledge. Taking up another example, it seems plausible that Narrative forms of 
argumentation could also have non-epistemic origins, perhaps being expressions of the 
veridiction conditions unique to the mode of Fiction, for example, as a means of developing and 
opening up possible worlds rather than a means of conveying information or Referential 
knowledge about remote entities. This might explain why, for example, Narrative forms often 
appear somewhat tenuous when placed within an epistemic or Referential context, for their 
original function may have had little or nothing to do with accessing remote beings, but 
something else entirely. Recognizing and appreciating the modal origins of various argument 
forms might thus be extremely beneficial for understanding their potential strengths and limits 
when operating within a given mode and when crossing from mode to mode. 
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